The modem era of political confrontation in the second half of the 20th –first half of the 21st century is characterized by the transition to the doctrine of global governance wars between conflicting States. The essence of this doctrine is to strengthen one’s own governance system as much as possible and critically weaken the enemy’s public administration system so that all the links of the state body cease to work effectively and cope with their tasks. The paper reveals the significance of governance wars on the example of the collapse of the USSR, which occurred without any direct military clash, but led to the loss of all strategic advantages for the Russian Federation, its successor. We put forward a structural model of global dominance, according to which governance depends on hard, soft, and smart power; we show that this understanding comes from generalizing J. Nye’s concept of soft power. We define the specifics of governance wars: long duration, all–encompassing and uncompromising nature. The following tools and algorithms of modem governance wars are considered: promotion of own ideology; working with local elites; masks syndrome and conspiracy in political elites; control over the information space; color revolutions; proxy wars; destruction of medical sovereignty. We reveal the relationship between governance wars and governance cycles that imply fluctuations in the effectiveness of public administration system both within one country and between countries. We consider five levels of social phenomena: meta, mega, macro, meso and micro levels, and substantiate their two–way hierarchy, when higher–level processes determine the development vector for lower–level processes, and lower–level processes form the mechanisms for implementing higher–level processes. We show that in modem conditions this paradigm is gaining importance, preventing the formation of distorted cognitive patterns in relation to the driving forces of national development.

The article examines the military–strategic confrontation between the USA and Russia, with a growing tendency toward conflict escalation in Ukraine. It is demonstrated that the observed paradox – the West’s diminishing fear of a “thermonuclear Armageddon” – is driven by the duality of Russia’s position after 1991. On the one hand, Russian elites fell under Western influence, yet on the other, they retained the potential to “rise” and restore the country’s political sovereignty, leveraging its military–strategic capabilities. As a result, another unique phenomenon emerged: the ambiguity of Russia’s “red lines” in foreign policy, as they were either left undefined or continuously shifted. This led to the West becoming accustomed to Russia’s excessive caution and failing to “hear” its new signals. The situation is further reinforced and exacerbated by the United States’ lack of foreign policy flexibility due to its adherence to a mental model of global dominance, which comprises four key elements: the presumption of America’s divine exceptionalism, the doctrine of irreconcilability, the strategy of totality, and the refusal–to–accept–unacceptable–costs syndrome. The effect of power indivisibility, as described by S. Lukes, compounds this model and heightens the insensitivity of the American establishment to the escalation of tensions in Ukraine. The study highlights that the U.S. administration employs two intellectual “legacies” of John Foster Dulles in its strategy: the doctrine of “brinkmanship” and the doctrine of “bearable cost.” Since Russia has not inflicted any tangible damage on the United States, there is no incentive for the latter to abandon Dulles’ legacy or to de–escalate the confrontation. The author argues that to change the situation, it is necessary to ensure unacceptable costs for the U.S. in this confrontation. Specific measures to increase the “cost” of American hegemony are discussed, which could shift the focus from unilateral pressure on Russia toward a more favorable environment for constructive negotiations.

В 2025 году вышла книга Владимира Попова «Китайская модель. Почему Китай раньше отставал от Запада, а теперь его обгоняет». В этой книге автор «расшифровывает» ту политику руководства Поднебесной, которая позволила стране шагнуть из третьего мира в первый. Структурирование построений автора позволило сформировать шестиэтапную модель геополитического успеха Китая, что позволяет, с одной стороны, убрать покров таинственности столь удивительных достижений страны, которая еще совсем недавно была скоплением мировой нищеты, а с другой – увидеть те конкретные управленческие решения, которые позволили этого добиться и могут служить в качестве образца для подражания. Вместе с тем сугубо эндогенная модель «китайского чуда», в которой страна обязана своим успехом только самой себе, представляется неполной. В связи с этим в дополнение к ней предлагается учет внешнего фактора, который включает такие элементы, как: историческая память политических элит; историческое осознание элитами демографического фактора; отсутствие догматизма мышления в политических элитах; овладение элитой фактором геополитической конъюнктуры. Обсуждается вопрос о том, почему СССР и Россия не смогли реализовать китайскую модель успеха, хотя во многих случаях были первопроходцами во внедрении соответствующих принципов управления.