Неэргодическая экономика

The purpose of imposing an unprecedented number of sanctions on Russia was not only to disrupt its economy, but also to create internal division through growing citizen discontent and internal unrest. However, the authority’s rapid response, who reacted to both economic destabilization and the society’s aggravated needs, made it possible to counteract the emerging threat and led to the society’s consolidation and the increase of its civic consciousness. The aim of the study is to understand the phenomenon of the social contract, which originated in the era of statehood formation and is the basis for the stable existence of the state. The study of the evolution of this phenomenon from antiquity to our days allowed us to define the principle of justice as a key principle in the formation of social contract. This principle, formulated in ancient times and later reflected in the teachings of J.–J. Rousseau, I. Kant, D. Rawls, etc., manifested itself most clearly in the ideological concepts of Russian philosophers of the 19th century. Historical analysis of the phenomenon of social contract allowed us to define it as an informal agreement between society and sovereign power, based on the consolidation of the former and the responsibility of the latter. The study of the need to rethink the social contract in Russia after 2022 has shown that the requests for the elaboration of the country’s ideology and the introduction of responsibility for anti–Russian propaganda (the request for justice) are the most acute in the public discourse. They are already reflected in the emerging new social contract, the basis of which is the agreement based on unity, justice, freedom, patriotism and sovereignty. Geopolitics, trust, ideology, narrow corridor concept, model of deliberative democracy, social contract, Russophobia, Russian world, justice, sovereignty.

The article presents a structural rethinking of P. Turchin’s theory of passionarity, operating not only with ruling elites, but also with counter–elites, which have all the attributes of elitists, except for access to power. To deepen the understanding of the process of political instability, we propose a graphical scheme of the political cycle, revealing the logic of interaction between elites, counterelites and masses. This scheme forms the core of the new theory of passionarity and demonstrates the action of the systemic driver of political conflicts. It is complemented by structural balances that take into account the factors concerning cyclical dynamics of political instability: family pattern, migration of counter–elites, and the resonance effect (coercion effect + contagion effect). In the development of the ideas of the theory of elites, a simple macroeconomic model linking the political struggle between elites and economic growth is considered; the research shows that exceeding a certain critical size of counter–elites leads to a slowdown in economic growth and the probability of a production recession. We have revealed the contribution of the new concept of elites to the theories of chaos, passionarity and erosion of institutions; we present the mechanism of complementarity of the theory of inclusive institutions and the theory of counter–elites. The paper presents the typology of sources of power and ruling classes (plutocracy, theocracy, militocracy, and bureaucracy); we make the comparison of these forms of government on the development of statehood. The article considers important additions to the theory of elites. In particular, we formulate the property of political ambivalence of plutocracy, when this form of government is effective in countries that are geopolitical hegemon or in the mode of economic expansion, and extremely ineffective in other cases; we reveal the connection between plutocracy and the phenomenon of supranational elites. The theory of elites and counter–elites is projected onto the entire geopolitical system of the world.