Introduction

One–quarter of the way through the 21st century, humanity once again found itself in a state of thermonuclear confrontation between the USA and Russia that is rooted in the geopolitical conflict in Ukraine. The situation in the Middle East is also extremely explosive and can provoke a destructive clash between Israel and Iran. This course of events is far from being reassuring and once again raises the question of the adequacy of measures instituted by the political establishment in many countries of the world. In this regard, it seems relevant to republish the book The Fundamental Laws of Human Stupidity by Carlo Cipolla, which was first released back in 1976 [Cipolla, 2024].

Cipolla’s book has long been an intellectual bestseller, but until recently it was perceived mainly as a satirical essay that did not fit the format of academic research. However, in almost half a century since the publication of the first edition, economic science has witnessed a substantial growth in knowledge and data that allow us to get back to the ideas of the Italian economic historian on a different theoretical and empirical basis and attempt to reinvent them in the context of traditional macroeconomics. Moreover, today it is possible to eliminate the excessive shock value and emotional pathos that was originally inherent in Cipolla’s work.

This revival of interest in the Italian’s book seems entirely justified, given his research output that allowed him to become a member of the national academies of sciences of Italy, the United Kingdom, and the USA. As rightly noted by Indonesian analysts, Cipolla’s work is by no means “an exercise in cynicism or defeatism, but rather a constructive effort to shed light on and address a significant obstacle to human progress” [Abia et al., 2023, p. 750]. The researcher’s two–dimensional diagram of human social behaviour was widely recognised and even underlay an interdisciplinary model study on the influence of randomly selected legislators on the parliament work [Pluchino et al., 2011], which, in turn, was subjected to international discussion [1]. Shortly after, Cipolla’s concept was tested for compliance with the theory of natural evolution on the basis of the agent–based model. The outcome was generally positive and allowed one to formulate a prerequisite for its stability: the interactions among the agents should be a zero–sum game [Tettamanzi, Da Costa Pereira, 2014].

What is worth discussing here is how the properties of two groups of economic agents corelated with constructive and destructive behaviour, as well as with the macroeconomic processes of economic growth and social development. Formally, this is equivalent to analysing two groups of the population – those who create new value added, and those who, through their actions, actually destroy it – within a single macroeconomic logic.

The study aims to formalise Cipolla’s major statements regarding the behavioural patterns of people and their integration into the general macroeconomic logic.

To achieve the stated purpose, we set two interrelated objectives:

— to construct a model of economic growth with a focus on various categories of the population with fundamentally different behaviour – constructive and destructive;

— to calculate the critical size of the destructive group of the population that disrupt the trajectory of economic growth.

The research methodology consists in extending the theory of production functions to the country’s disparate population that splits into two social groups qualitatively heterogeneous according to their behavioural properties. The research method resides in formulating a dynamic production function taking into account the population structure to obtain a differential equation of economic growth, which allows determining the properties of the simulated system. The novelty of the author’s approach lies in the projection of the behavioural properties of economic agents onto the process of economic growth, as well as in the generalisation and new interpretations of the actions of different social groups within the macroeconomic system.

The phenomenon of stupidity: A review of related ideas

Cipolla’s concept introduces an innovative element into economics, which is related to the phenomenon of stupidity. Such a “new” factor in human evolution is capable of systematically cooling economic growth, and sometimes even stopping it. In this context, we can talk about expanding historical analysis through the previously omitted biosocial factor.

To what extent can such a claim be legitimate?

The reasons why the answer to this question should be positive are the following.

First, stupidity as a phenomenon is comparable to happiness, the equally ephemeral and elusive side of our life. However, today there exists a completely independent direction of economics, namely the economics of happiness [Layard, 2012]. This is an interdisciplinary field: happiness is studied by economists, sociologists, psychologists, philosophers, and neuroscientists. There is every reason to believe that stupidity belongs to this category of interdisciplinary research.

Second, stupidity is something essentially opposed to human capital, which has also become an integral part of economic theory [Becker, 2003]. If human capital is a combination of skills, knowledge and motivation that increase the efficiency oflabour and production, then stupidity, on the contrary, is a set of errors leading to a fall in the productivity of individual actions and the entire social system. Together, stupidity and human capital add to economic analysis and make it more symmetrical.

Third, stupidity as a biological phenomenon acts as the antipode of talent. Meanwhile, today there already exists an evidence–based theory of talent distribution [Natkhov, Polishchuk, 2012; 2019]. Both talent and stupidity are believed to be innate qualities crucial in establishing the society structure and classing individuals into professional niches. These two phenomena combined could also make economic analysis more comprehensive.

Fourth, the phenomenon of stupidity is not the first factor overlooked in human society development. Some attempts have already been made to radically overhaul the path of our civilization under the influence of psychoactive substances. Flavour additives and condiments with negligible psychoactivity – sugar, coffee, tea, cocoa, spices, etc. – ignited the era of colonial conquests and international trade. However, such factors as substances and stupidity have not yet been integrated into the theory of social development.

Fifth, an alternative to the cohort of stupid people is echoed in the theory of elites. For example, Turchin’s [2024] theory features the elites in power and the so–called “counter–elites” that can greatly vary in size over different historical periods. However, it is precisely the interaction of elites and counter–elites that acts as the driving force behind the evolution of the state, as well as the primary reason for the periodic collapse of the statehood itself. There are reasons to believe that the population of stupid people performs a similar mission in heating up and cooling down economic growth. As Nassim Taleb put it in his review of Cipolla’s book: "Could it be that Mother Nature (or God, whatever your theology) wants to put a brake on things, reduce the speed of progress, slow down the growth of your employer, prevent GDP from an exponential rise so the economy doesn’t overheat? So She created the stupid person acting against both his and the collective interest to do just that?” [2].

Sixth, in terms of instruments, there are also precedents for considering different layers of the workforce – employees of the public and private sectors of the economy that differ functionally as described by the Findlay–Wilson function [Findlay, Wilson, 1984]. Moreover, this dependence was successfully transferred to the description of economic growth taking into account elites and counter–elites [Balatsky, 2024]. There is no real evidence not to apply this approach to integrating fools into the economic growth scheme.

Thus, today there are all the theoretical, empirical and instrumental grounds for reconsidering the work of Carlo Cipolla in the context of the macroeconomics of stupidity. However, such terminology does not fit well with academic standards and may cause quite natural intellectual rejection. In this regard, we can propose a temporary restatement conveying the meaning of the original term, namely the macroeconomics of errors. The fact is that the existence of the “population of stupid people” is, in essence, a personification of the process of taking wrong decisions and making mistakes. Broadly speaking, intelligent people commit mistakes as do stupid individuals, but they do so in extreme conditions or under particularly complicated circumstances. Hence, in the economy there appears a certain source of errors embodied in a certain contingent of people, and the flow of errors itself affects the macroeconomic result according to its intensity. In this case, the question of how stupid or reasonable the people generating the flow of errors are is relegated to the periphery and is of no fundamental importance. In the same vein, we can use another term – the macroeconomics of complexity, – where the errors themselves are generated by an overly complex social system. Here, the source of errors is the system, which “shifts” these errors mainly onto specific “stupid” individuals, and thereafter the errors reduce the efficiency of the system. In our study, we use the macroeconomics of errors and the macroeconomics of stupidity as synonyms, addressing one or another interpretation based on the objectives of the study, and then we generalise these phenomena. Of key importance here is that the phenomena of complexity, stupidity and errors are closely intertwined within a single cause–and–effect node.

Microeconomics of stupidity: A typology of market actors

Following Cipolla’s logic, in terms of intelligence or stupidity there are four groups of individuals based on the combination of binary outcomes in two dimensions: the consequences of people’s actions for themselves and for those around them, and the possible result – positive or negative. Market actors are classified in Table 1.

Table 1. A typology of market actors by their mental properties

Source: Own compilation based on [Cipolla, 2024].

According to this classification, “intelligent people” can benefit by bringing benefits to others; “bandits” pursue their own interests to the detriment of others; “helpless people” contribute to society but impoverish themselves; and “stupid people” cause losses to themselves and others. Thus, “intelligent people” create new goods, “bandits” and “helpless people” redistribute them but do not create them, and “stupid people” destroy them, which predetermines the destructive role of stupid individuals in the economy and social system.

Table 1 gives an idea of the distribution of economic agents in society. At first glance, the typology seems too refined and idealised due to the fact that each person can act inconsistently, and, therefore, it is difficult to unambiguously distribute actors across the four types. However, Cipolla dismisses this counterargument: all a person’s actions can be aggregated into a weighted average value, which ultimately determines his/her place in one of the four quadrants.

Obviously, the simplest way to classify people is a monetary–based assessment of their behaviour in the form of profits and losses, but these categories can also be expressed in non–material form; the essence does not change. The outcome for society (other people) is the sum of the states for individuals who fall within the subject’s zone of influence [3].

For stupid individuals to influence macro processes, it is not only their numbers, but also the disruptive power of their stupidity is of importance. Here, we also have an intersection of two binary outcomes: on the biological and on the social scale (Table 2). Biologically, stupidity in a person may simply be quite expressed, or he/she may inherit the stupidity gene in an exceptional dose. Socially, they may or may not be in power, occupying influential positions in political and corporate structures. Power makes stupid individuals extremely dangerous to society. If people’s stupidity is limited and they do not have power, they pose a local danger, exclusively in the place where they are. If a person’s stupidity is overwhelming, and they are at the top of the power hierarchy, then they represent a global danger for the entire social system (Table 2).

Table 2. A typology of stupid people according to the losses they cause

Source: Own compilation based on [Cipolla, 2024].

Further in our research we will build on the following Cipolla’s basic provisions regarding the phenomenon of stupidity.

1. All people are born unequal: some are stupid and others are not. Stupidity is not predetermined by cultural and social factors, it is a typical product of biology, like red hair or a particular blood type.

2. The fraction of stupid people within a population (Cipolla denotes it by the symbol y) is a constant. Stupid individuals are proportionally as numerous among men as among women. “The proportion of stupid people is invariant to intellectual, social or geographic segmentation. The ratio will be the same among Nobel Prize winners as it will be among a selection of tax accountants” [Cipolla, 2024, p. 6]. Just as the natural sex ratio at birth is approximately equal in all geographic areas and in all peoples, so the proportion of stupid people tends to be standardised.

3. The mechanisms for keeping the influence of stupid individuals vary: in the preindustrial era, this was the class and caste systems, where stupid persons were born into rich and influential families and eventually occupied high positions; in today’s world, political parties and bureaucratic systems, coupled with democracy, have become a social elevator allowing stupid people to realise their potential.

4. In societies experiencing growth and decline, the proportion of stupid individuals is the same, but the numbers of intelligent people and bandits and their attitude towards stupid population differ. It is precisely the transit of reasonable people to the cohort of “bandits” that is characteristic of degrading communities, as well as their indifference to stupid members of society, who are allowed to be active and take more destructive actions.

Macroeconomics of stupidity: Regimes of economic growth

Developing Cipolla’s concept considering the case of modeling elites and counterelites [Balatsky, 2024], let us look at the simplest macroeconomic model:

                                                   (1)

                                                                               (2)

                                                                                                  (3)

                                                                            (4)

where Y is GDP volume; I is the number of intelligent people in a country; S is the number of stupid people; N is total population of a country; С > 0, α > 0 and β > 0 are parameters of the Cobb–Douglas production function (1); γ is the fraction of stupid population; t is time (year).

Function (1) shows the dependence of national production (Y) on the number of reasonable people (I) and stupid people (S), when the former create value added (α > 0), and the latter destroy it (–β < 0). Equation (2) calculates the population balance, and equations (3) and (4) establish the population structure.

In terms of the designations introduced, I and S are the number of intelligent people and stupid people classified in Table 1, and α and β are the strength of intelligence and stupidity, respectively, which is presented in Table 2.

In model (1)–(4), there are only two populations in contrast to the four population groups considered above. This means that the bandits whose benefits are less than the loss they cause are added to the category “the intelligent”, as are helpless people who benefit others more than their own losses; the rest of bandits and helpless persons are added to the category “the stupid”. This simplification allows us to more clearly display the process of economic growth considering population groups with different functions.

If we introduce the indicators of economic growth rates (λ=(dY/dt)/Y=ΔY/Y) and population (n=(dN/dt)/N=ΔN/N), then the equation of economic growth can be written as follows:

                                                                                                               (5)

Equation (5) allows us to define two possible modes:

                                                                       (6)

                                                                      (7)

Inequality (6) shows the critical proportion of stupid people at which there is an increase in the welfare of the population (GDP per capita); inequality (7) describes the critical proportion of stupid people at which economic growth (GDP) is still possible if population grows. This means that the average welfare of the population increases (λ/n > 1) if γ < γ* for n > 0, where

                                                                                                               (8)

Accordingly, economic growth is sustained (λ > 0), when γ < γ** for n > 0, where

                                                                                                               (9)

As seen from formulas (8) and (9), the first–order boundary γ* imposes more stringent requirements on the scale of stupidity in society than the second–order boundary γ**. However, to comprehend the scale of these requirements, we should turn to the results of scenario calculations, in which the balance of power between the intelligent and the stupid was tested: ω = α/β (Table 3).

Table 3. Results of scenario calculations

Source: Own calculations based on formula (6).

The first four scenarios in Table 3 seem to be the most meaningful. For example, if reasonable people are 5 times stronger in their influence on the economy compared to the stupid, then the tolerance of public welfare for stupid people is quite high – the permissible norm is 2/5 of the entire population. If the ratio w is less than 3, then the economy can withstand only 7 % of stupid people. As for the impact of stupid population on economic growth, it is quite difficult for them to stop it – the number of stupid ones must be huge. The situation gets dramatic only when power in the country ends up almost entirely in the hands of stupid people (scenarios no. 9 and no. 10). However, our calculations show that economic growth itself is quite resistant to mass stupidity, which is equivalent to society having a kind of immunity to the destructive behaviour of individuals.

Now, consider the crisis mechanism in accordance with Cipolla’s logic. Let at some moment t the first–order boundary has the value:

                                                                                                             (10)

There is also the inequality γ < γ*(t), that is, the existing number of stupid members of society allows the average social welfare to increase.

Cipolla insists that γ = const, while the balance of power between the intelligent and the stupid may change over time due to some stupid people taking commanding heights and some stupid leaders being replaced by even stupider persons. Then, at the next moment in time, the influence of reasonable people will decrease and that of stupid ones will increase so that the inequalities γ*(t+1) < γ < γ*(t) will be fulfilled, where

                (11)

In this situation, the actual fraction of stupid individuals turns out to be higher than the critical one and the level of welfare starts falling, which marks the beginning of a social crisis (for simplicity, we can assume Δα=Δβ, which guarantees a decrease in γ*(t+1) compared to γ*(t)).

Thus, the parameters of the production function (1) α and β are subject to periodic exogenous changes, which provokes a violation of conditions (6) and (7), causing a slowdown in welfare growth per capita or even the growth of GDP. This scheme as a whole seems consistent and quite relevant to the phenomena observed.

The main result of model (1)–(4) is that the preservation or, conversely, the violation of the macroeconomic regime in it depends on the calculated fraction of stupid people, which fluctuates randomly according to the rotation of political and managerial cadre. Thus, despite its simplicity, model (1)–(4) even assumes some randomisation.

We cannot help noting the following two aspects in the equation of economic growth (5).

First, despite its extreme simplicity, the scenario calculations showed some nontriviality of the quantitative patterns. For example, a 1.8-time decrease in the coefficient ω in scenarios no. 1 and no. 4 leads to a 6-fold reduction in the first–order boundary, which is quite difficult to predict using the given formulas.

Second, the requirement α > 1, which follows from formula (8), is of high interest. This means that in order to successfully resist stupid people and prevent the economic system’s efficiency from declining, intelligent persons must ensure for themselves some minimal influence in the management and production system. Otherwise, the stupid, regardless of their positions in power and in the economy, will push the decomposition of the welfare system. This is where the thesis of the minimal rationality of society lies in.

Interestingly enough, the idea that there is a need for some minimal rational basis in society is surprising and non–trivial within the simple calculations carried out above. It is worth noting that the overwhelming majority of Cobb–Douglas functions applied in theoretical and applied research are linearly homogeneous, that is, with respect to function (1), they are characterised by the condition α + β = 1. This directly contradicts the requirement α > 1. Thus, the thesis about the minimal rationality of society is violated in most logical constructions of macroeconomics.

Discussion of results: Possible interpretations

Model (1)–(4) is based on the assumption that there is a group of people in society who are incapable of making deliberate, rational decisions. This circumstance alone significantly expands the boundaries of modern economic theory.

The point is that the main postulate of economics is the rationality of economic agents. This assumption is believed to be the cornerstone of all economic constructions, which, if violated, results in both economic activity and economic theory losing their sense. In this regard, it is sufficient to point out Becker’s triad, i.e., three fundamental ideas forming the heart of the economic approach: maximising behaviour, market equilibrium, and stable preferences [Becker, 1987]. However, model (1)–(4) includes rational agents and stupid individuals, while still allowing meaningful conclusions to be drawn. Thus, when describing an economic system in macroeconomic terms, it is possible, if not to exclude, but at least to significantly limit the requirement of rationality.

Today, the postulate of rationality is no longer used in its original simple formulation. Discussions on this issue have long since become an independent research area. For instance, the postulate of rationality methodologically contradicts the “black box” principle used in the modelling of economic systems and implying that there is a hidden part in it with poorly understood hidden characteristics and connections between the elements [Kim, 2018]. In this sense, model (1)–(4) smooths out this contradiction: rational behaviour is typical of intelligent people, and the stupidity of the rest is not discussed, but viewed as a “black box”.

Clearly, the postulate of rationality can be modified to eliminate contradictions when describing the system. The ways to do so are closely examined in scholarly publications [Avtonomov, 2017; Belyanin, 2017; Zaostrovtsev, 2017; Rubinstein, 2017]. Nevertheless, despite these methodological advances, it is unlikely that the very principle of rationality will be rejected [Kapelyushnikov, 2017]. In this regard, the combination of rational and fundamentally irrational subjects within the framework of model (1)–(4) seems to be an interesting result that can be used in other formulations of macroeconomic problems. Therefore, the combination of rational and fundamentally irrational actors within model (1)–(4) seems to be an inspiring result that can be used when formulating other macroeconomic problems.

There is another important aspect that expands the scope of application of the macroeconomic model (5). As mentioned earlier, the interpretation of the model in stupidity–related terms may be perceived as radical and not entirely in line with academic traditions. To overcome this shortcoming, the original models (1)–(4) may be conceptualised differently and thereby receive a completely different interpretation. For example, the population size and its two groups can be changed to the number of problems addressed in the economy (N), which are categorised into those resolved successfully (correctly) (I) and unsuccessfully (incorrectly) (S). Then the parameter a evaluates the contribution to the economy of correctly solved problems, and the parameter β assesses the losses to the economy caused by incorrectly solved problems. Interpreted this way, the variable S actually records the number of errors accumulated in the system.

Then, the original proposition about the fatality of stupid people can be removed from the agenda and replaced by the idea of society’s limited ability to successfully resolve the problems facing it. At the same time, the mistakes made may no longer be connected with the initial existential stupidity of people, but with their lack of competence to deal with their problems. This result, in turn, is largely determined by the faulty placement of personnel in the social system, where poorly qualified individuals occupy high positions. With this approach, the content of Table 2 becomes even more transparent and meaningful: instead of biological differences, asymmetries in the professional training are deemed, and instead of social (hierarchical) inequality – the complexity of the problems being tackled.

Ergo, the absolute inability of some market actors – stupid people – to think adequately is replaced by a particular mismatch between a person and the position he/ she occupies depending on their skills, knowledge and experience, as well as on the scale, complexity and urgency of the tasks they confront. However, such a discrepancy between labour resources and jobs indicates systemic management errors in society, and, thus, model (5) also serves as an antecedent for the macroeconomics of errors. In this vein, Table 2 not only specifies the sources of errors committed, but also gives insights into HR decision–making regarding incentives and punishment for employees’ errors, which is presented in Table 1. For example, when making serious mistakes, an initially poorly qualified employee deserves to be fired, not rewarded; otherwise, the category “stupid people” in the staff matrix (Table 1) fills up and a self– sustaining regime with destructive implications for the economy arises.

No less remarkable is that the thesis about the minimal rationality of society in the macroeconomics of errors is transformed into the thesis about the minimal strategic nature of the tasks addressed. This means that the problems managed successfully must be significant enough (α > 1); otherwise, any batch of errors will reduce return on the objectives attained when problems appear faster than goods and services (λ/n < 1).

From the above reasoning, it is clear that the interpretation of equation (5) in error–related terms is academically neutral and removes the shock value characteristic of the macroeconomics of stupidity. Moreover, such an interpretation, among other things, allows us to complete the theory providing for the complexity factor. The fact is that mistakes are not only, and not so much, associated with the initial stupidity or incompetence of people, but with the amount and complexity of the tasks to tackle. In this case, the current proportion у depends on the problems’ average complexity (K), for example: γ = θK, where θ is the sensitivity coefficient of the share of errors to the problems’ average complexity. Then Cipolla’s hypothesis that the fraction γ is a constant is removed, and the entire theory becomes more dynamic. Then, the firstorder boundary is transformed into a similar critical value for the social system’s complexity:

                                                                                                             (12)

Thus, an overly complicated system leads to a decline in the population’s welfare, and in an even more refined case for the second–order boundary, it can result in a “reversal” of economic growth. Such a clear dependence of the development of society on its complexity makes the constructed model even more attractive.

Another interpretation of model (5), if its meaning is minimally revised, seems much more intriguing. Here, instead of intelligent people and stupid people, we consider the groups of “friends” (I) and “enemies” (S) of the country. Friends are the country’s entire population engaged in creative activity, while enemies are those engaged in subversive activities on the territory of the state with the aim of inflicting damage on it. The category of “enemies” may include ordinary criminals who act destructively against property and people, as well as individuals conducting “nonviolent” subversive activities against the government and individual government structures. Such people disrupt the established order and thus undermine economic growth. Seen in this way, model (5) reproduces the macroeconomics of harm.

A social group that wrecks the economy through its actions and thereby reduces the country’s GDP produces three important features of model (5). First, the fraction of people harmful to the country is not constant, which rejects Cipolla’s basic hypothesis. Moreover, activities of internal and external secret services are focused on reducing (increasing) the proportion of saboteurs. Hence, the parameters of model (5) are more dynamic. Second, the question of the intellectual competence of different social groups finally loses its relevance, and the factor of stupidity vanishes as such. Enemies no longer falls under the category of “irrational agents” that harm themselves and others. On the contrary, agents of influence may have the most outstanding educational, professional and intellectual characteristics, which only exacerbates the harm they cause. Third, subversion itself involves disproportionately large losses. For example, constructing a building requires many different specialists (architects, engineers, builders, etc.), whereas only one person is enough to destroy it by explosion. Therefore, model (5) contains the condition: β >> α, that is, the specific influence of enemies is much greater than that of friends. With the saboteurs’ relative “killing power” (ω) known, it is possible to estimate their proportion sufficient to undermine economic growth.

The latter needs to be explained. In the macroeconomics of stupidity, inequality (6) was active, which, if fulfilled, resulted in inequality (7) losing its meaning and significance. In the macroeconomics of harm, the situation is radically different. For instance, as seen from scenario no. 10 (Table 3), a disruption in economic growth with a relatively low fraction of stupid individuals (6% of the total population) is only possible if the parameter β is 13.5 times greater than α. However, as stated above, such a value for sabotage operations is rather modest, while the actual ratio between values can differ by 2–3 orders of magnitude. For example, if the parameter β (β = 5.0) is 100 times greater than α (α = 0.05), then economic recession can be caused by a hostile group of 1 % of the country’s population. Thus, in the macroeconomics of harm, inequality (7) gets active and has a significant role.

As follows from the above, the interpretation of model (5) from the position of harm inflicted on the country by an unfriendly group of people may be even more realistic and meaningful than its original version.

The macroeconomics of harm appears to have a high potential due to two reasons.

Firstly, the vast majority of security models consider a completely different scheme [Shumov, 2015]. There emerges a whole bunch of issues that require analysing different segments of the economic, social and technological space. For example, some attempts are made to deem the effect of destructive events in the digital space on the economic security of the state [Avdiyskiy, Ivanov, 2024]. At the same time, there are works addressing the integration problems of various ethnic groups with the dichotomy of values typical of them [Shumov, 2018]. On the other hand, studies revealing the destructive impact of supranational elites at certain stages of a country’s development also fit well into the logic of model (1)–(4) [Ekimova, 2024]. All this creates an empirical basis for applying macromodel (5) with all modifications and adaptation it needs.

Secondly, the macroeconomics of harm demonstrates that the original model (1)– (4) is quite flexible in terms of content. By interpreting social groups differently, one can obtain a distinct but still constructive view of economic reality. It is quite possible that the paired categories “intelligent people / stupid people” and “friends / enemies” do not exhaust the possible interpretations. Therefore, further applications of the proposed model can be found. Importantly, the potential of possible applications is largely due to the possibility of transition from the macro level to the meso– and micro levels [Krokhicheva, Arkhipov, Kazantseva, 2019].

Macroeconomics of destructiveness: A summary of results

The interpretations considered above show that the original model (5) can be viewed in a generalised context, namely the macroeconomics of destructiveness. The categories of “intelligent people” or “saboteurs” present in society, as well as the fact of unresolved problems have a common basis, namely an element, whose destructive behaviour causes losses to the system. This is why model (5) can be seen as a fairly generalised regime of economic growth in the presence of destructive activity.

Today’s scientific community is striving to comprehensively understand the phenomenon of destructiveness, which is now perceived as an integral part of human civilisation. A number of authors claim that there are some global ideas initially circulating in society that are completely absurd, but shaped as religious and ideological dogmas, they form the mindset of huge percentage of the population. Such a state of affairs is maintained by people’s stupidity, generated by satiety with education and knowledge, when they meekly accept their fate and agree with the exploitation of themselves [Welles, 2018].

Researchers also address the issues of local manifestations of destructiveness. Contrary to the deep–seated belief that gambling is a kind of tax on stupidity, there are empirical studies indicating that there is a positive correlation between the intelligence level and expenditure on betting: “a one standard deviation increase in mathematical IQ from the mean increases the probability of participation in betting by more than a third, the bettor’s annual amount wagered by a half and his annual losses by 40 %” [Suhonen et al., 2020, p. 1]. Gambling is thus a form of entertainment for intelligent people who thereby cause themselves financial losses. In this case, developed intelligence manifests itself in a destructive way, and the very concept of stupidity is blurred.

Some economists, on the contrary, advocate discarding the so–called “rational riddles”, i.e., irrational behaviour based on rational motives [Št’astný, 2014]. Instead of seeking such stylised explanations, it is suggested to simply consult with people whose behaviour seems strange. To prove the effectiveness of such an approach, Št’astný [2014] views a real case of theatre tickets underpricing and queues at the box office (a reasonable and standard alternative is to raise the price and eliminate the queues): a survey of managers showed that such an outcome is not associated with some sophisticated policy, but with an elementary ignorance of the principles of economics and the real situation. Here, stupidity takes the form of mistakes due to lack of competence.

There are already well–founded studies deepening the understanding of stupidity as such. Alvesson and Spicer [2016] introduce the concept of functional stupidity, i.e., the inability or unwillingness to use cognitive and reflective capacities in anything other than narrow and circumspect ways. Functional stupidity means thinking within the norm, that is, over–adapting to certain ways of thinking and acting. Smart people are by no means immune to functional stupidity. Moreover, people who are quite astute and have successful careers typically have high levels of functional stupidity. In some cases, functional stupidity has great benefits: it helps people cope with their doubts, be happy, feel comfortable in conditions of uncertainty, get along with colleagues and superiors, demonstrate a positive attitude and optimism, and be more productive. However, in extreme cases, functional stupidity can form cynicism and alienation in people, which ultimately makes them completely detached from their jobs. For organisations at large, functional stupidity can lead to people becoming blind to problems. When this quality becomes the norm and routine, the risk of large–scale disasters arises; with moderate functional stupidity, suboptimal structures and practices start growing in number [Ibid.]. In such cases, we are dealing with stupidity embodied in multiple errors due to emotional atrophy and people lacking wide perception of the world and their workplaces.

There are also publications on the issues of harm. Vanderslice [2021; 2022] introduces the concept of harm of inclusive and extractive institutions in order to measure their relative effectiveness; otherwise, inclusive institutions have all the advantages, and extractive ones have the disadvantages, while the global harmfulness of countries following the former regime is much greater than that of countries implementing the latter. Thus, the criterion of production activity and income of countries with inclusive regimes should be supplemented by the criterion of the harm they cause to other nations [Ibid.]. In turn, DeMartino [2022] shows that the so–called “heroic economists” who strive to achieve maximum production results are still reckless and do not take into account the side effects of this process. As the author rightly points out, “they take far too many chances with the lives of others while having no skin in the game themselves” [Ibid., p. 217]; their activities destroy society without giving due credit to the countless victims of economic progress. “Today hubris in the economics profession is tempered by a series of unwelcome surprises, including the stunning failure of market reform in Russia and other post–Soviet countries, a series of devastating financial crises (including the crisis of 2008), and existential crises associated with climate change” [Ibid., p. 218]. In this case, we are talking about the long–term results of the decisions made, which allows us to look at such concepts as “stupidity” and “mistakes” from a different angle: what is intelligent and useful in the short term turns out to be stupid and harmful in the long run. This is fully consistent with the macroeconomic practice of differentiating effects in the short, medium and long term.

In any case, destructive behaviour has become the norm not only in our lives, but also in economic research. At the same time, destructiveness presupposes a fairly broad and varied interpretation, but there is no longer doubt that the sources of destructiveness in the economic system must be taken into account.

Conclusion

Projecting Cipolla’s ideas about different social groups – intelligent people and stupid people – onto the macro level allowed constructing a simple model that combined rational and irrational behaviour of economic agents, which in itself is a rather unexpected outcome. An analytical study of the constructed model regimes made it possible to establish a remarkable property of the social system, namely the requirement of minimal rationality of society consisting in the fact that in order to maintain macroeconomic efficiency, intelligent individuals must ensure for themselves some minimal influence in the management and production system. Further numerical experiments with the model showed that, depending on which of the two model parameters is larger, two problems arise: a local one, where the growth of GDP per capita is disrupted, and a global one, where GDP growth is bruised.

Having analysed different interpretations, we found that the constructed model can be adapted to the macroeconomics of errors and the macroeconomics of harm. In the first case, not two types of economic agents, but two types of tasks are considered, i.e., those resolved successfully or unsuccessfully; in the second case, the action of two social groups within the country is simulated – the ordinary population conducting creative activities to increase GDP and a cohort of saboteurs engaged in counterproductive work to disrupt public order and cause damage. The expanded interpretations of the original model allow removing its initially excessive emotional pathos regarding the division of people according to their cognitive skill levels. As it turns out, considering two groups with asymmetric properties is more general in nature and allows for a fairly constructive modelling of different economic development paths, including the issues of the country’s economic and political security.

All the three interpretations of the constructed model – the macroeconomics of stupidity, mistakes and harm – allow us to more objectively examine the ratio between constructive and destructive forces of economic development. Even such different analytical sections of social dynamics as people’s cognitive qualities, their intentions and the outcome of the tasks can be considered within the framework of a universal theory, which is based on an extremely simple model design. The model itself provides the basis for the macroeconomics of destructiveness, which has a wide range of interpretations and applications.

The main result of the macroeconomics of destructiveness is that, unlike traditional macroeconomic models and theories, it considers not a homogeneous set of economic agents, but a fundamentally heterogeneous one. In such a scheme, no regulatory actions imply the same reaction from market participants, and therefore the effectiveness of regulation becomes dependent, among other things, on the ratio of heterogeneous groups of market participants. However, this is already a different logic and philosophy of macroeconomic research.

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