Неэргодическая экономика

Авторский аналитический Интернет-журнал

Изучение широкого спектра проблем экономики

External Labor Migration

Most countries specialize in either exporting or importing labor. Here, too, Russia is off the beaten path. It ships labor both in and out. This article examines the related problems and suggests how migrational streams may be optimized. The analysis is based on the unique statistical data of the Ministry of Labour, Russian Federation.

Let us begin with a look at Russia’s general migration potential, the background for all more specific processes. Figures from the State Committee for Statistics show that migration to and from the country is very high (see Tables 1 and 2). In 1993, for example, 3720000 people from as many as 180 countries outside the former Soviet Union came to Russia. The portion of the “big six” countries, whose citizens accounted for more than 5% of the total influx each, was 57%. The main supplier was China, which accounted for 10% of the total. The greatest diffusion of occupations was rep resented by nationals of Poland, Finland, and China.

In turn, Russian citizens went to 151 countries, and their number, 4140000, exceeded the total of those who entered Russia. The concentration of Russians abroad is also higher: 62% went to the “big six.” The “big six” is basically the same both ways, only with Mongolia yielding its place to Turkey in the latter case. Today, therefore, the main area of external migration is fairly stable. It includes China, Finland, Germany, Poland, the United States, Turkey, and Mongolia. China is at the top of the list of those “absorbing” Russian labor, while the most intensive penetration of service occupations by the Russian work force occurs in Japan and Germany.

The difference in input–output migration structures is fairly interesting. The percentage of service occupations among those leaving Russia is almost twice that among arrivals in the country. This category among Russians abroad amounts to nearly one million. Departures on business trips, meanwhile, are almost 13% less than arrivals of foreign businessmen.

 

Export of labor

 

Emigration from Russia, notably the brain drain, is still an acute problem. The following figures speak of the probable scale and structure of the process today. Among students, potential emigrants number 37%, of whom 10% have unambiguously stated their wish to live and work abroad; some 13% of scientists in basic research are prepared to leave at once, and 40% are not averse to doing the same [1]. Eighty percent of candidates and doctors of science employed in aerospace and 47% of nuclear specialists are interested in jobs abroad. Young candidates of science and researchers without an aca demic degree are the most inclined to leave the country: as many as 14.2% of the former are giving it serious thought. Those leaving in organized groups are mainly seamen employed on foreign ships and students and schoolchildren departing for seasonal work; those who go by direct contacts are mainly service personnel (waiters, drivers, tool adjusters, and fitters) and construction workers. On the whole, potential labor emigration is quite considerable: sociological exploration shows that something like 5 to 6 million people are pre pared to take jobs abroad within the next two or three years [2], which amounts to approximately 7 or 8% of the total Russian labor force. Note for the sake of comparison that in some labor–exporting countries the figure is as high as 15% of the able-bodied population. In Turkey, for example, the figure approaches 7% of the total labor potential. Since the tolerable extreme here by international standards is 12%, the possible export of labor from Russia will in no case be destructive. Still, the departure of so many people will doubtless complicate matters at certain enterprises and even in entire industries as, for example, in Egypt, where labor shortages have hit construction and agriculture for this very reason.

 

Table 1. Foreign nationals entering Russia (1993), %

Countries

Purpose of trip

Total

business

tourism

private

transit

service of transport

China

11.0

6.4

0.9

0.4

1.5

20.2

Finland

4.5

9.5

0.5

0.0

1.8

16.3

Germany

3.5

4.6

0.3

0.1

0.8

9.3

Mongolia

5.3

0.0

0.9

0.9

0.5

7.6

United States

3.5

3.1

0.1

0.0

0.3

7.0

Poland

1.2

2.6

0.2

0.2

2.4

6.6

France

1.3

1.3

0.1

0.0

0.3

3.0

Italy

1.2

1.1

0.0

0.1

0.2

2.6

England

1.3

0.8

0.0

0.0

0.3

2.4

Sweden

0.6

1.0

0.1

0.0

0.1

1.8

Japan

0.7

0.5

0.0

0.1

0.3

1.6

Turkey

0.6

0.5

0.2

0.0

0.4

1.7

Other countries

8.3

5.4

1.2

1.0

4.0

19.9

Total

43.0

36.8

4.5

2.8

12.9

100.0

 

 

Table 2. Destination of departing Russians (1993), %

Countries

Purpose of trip

Total

business

tourism

private

service of transport

China

5.9

9.5

0.1

3.3

18.8

Germany

4.9

1.8

6.9

2.4

16.0

Finland

1.7

3.1

0.9

1.7

7.4

Turkey

0.6

4.2

0.7

1.1

6.6

Poland

1.0

3.2

1.0

1.1

6.3

United States

2.2

0.2

2.2

0.5

5.1

Japan

0.4

0.3

0.0

2.4

3.1

Other countries

12.9

8.9

4.0

10.9

36.7

Total

29.6

31.2

15.8

23.4

100.0

 

The more serious consequences caused by emigration of Russians will be the following.

Labor will be diverted from the needs of Russia’s own economy. Estimates made by UN-recommended methods (subtraction from the aggregate social product of the direct and indirect costs of training the emigrants and the forfeited benefit from their activity in the country) show that the departure of one specialist causes Russia a loss of approximately US $300000 [1]. (The loss to India caused by the emigration of one graduate engineer is about a tenth of this figure.) Recovery of the loss is highly doubtful. In any case, special studies in Italy, which is regarded as an exclusively donor country, showed that the state spends twice as much on training labor power as it gains from hard–currency remittances of Italian emigrants. UN estimates show that all varieties of US aid to developing countries do not make up for the losses incurred from export of trained labor.

Active emigration will drastically slow up growth of priority trends in the economy, science, and technology. Physicists, mathematicians, programmers, engineers, geneticists, biochemists, virologists, and so on, that is, specialists on whom Russia’s social and techno logical breakthrough depends, are typical potential emigrants. (It is not amiss to note here that the striving of highly–trained Mexicans to make a career in the United States is partly spurred by the chronic failure of the Mexican government to secure the country’s tech nological modernization.) To balance out the losses by employing qualified labor from abroad is, however, difficult and costly. Suffice it to say that the salaries of foreign specialists are many times (sometimes as much as ten times) higher than those of local specialists of the same level of training.

Society will lose not simply workers, but people endowed with a high degree of general and professional initiative. Judge for yourself: nearly one–third specialists aiming to emigrate regularly publish at home and abroad; knowledge of computers among potential emigrants is some fifty percent higher than among other respondent [3].

Emigration encompasses the more cultured population groups with definite family traditions. Sociological polls show that the parents of young men and women intending to leave the country usually have a higher education and, in 95 out of 100 cases approve of their children’s intention. Moreover, young people aiming to go abroad have a better command of foreign languages and make better progress at school and college [1].

The drain of specialists may bring about serious demographic damage, because most of the departing young people are male. Krasnodar Krai, whence as many as 654 people, all of them males, had gone abroad under the auspices of nongovernmental agencies as of January 1, 1994, is a striking example.

Emigration of labor may cause aging of the population. In particular, an incontestable relation between the specialists’ age and their intention to emigrate was found: the younger they are, the greater is their resolution to find a job abroad [3].

The emigrants whom the country is liable to lose are progressively–minded and optimistic people. Polls show that the percentage of respondents favoring mar ket reforms and privatization of state property is con siderably higher among those who intend to work abroad than among the rest [1].

The above data reflect the potential supply of Russian labor to the international labor market. However, the latter is not yet ready to absorb so much labor from Russia. The International Migration Organization reports that Western countries will not have jobs for more than 200000 Russians in the next few years. Top managers of 150 US corporations discussed competitiveness and estimated employment opportunities in the United States up to year 2010 at no more than half a million jobs for people from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Eastern Europe. At the same time, governments of many recipient countries are going over to rigid regulation of the foreign labor influx. Since 1991, for example, the quota for people seeking permanent employment in the United States has been 140000 persons. In addition, organization of export of Russian labor is still in its infancy. Even in Krasnodar Krai, where emigration is running relatively high, only three nongovernmental organizations specialize in employment of Russians abroad. According to the Ministry of Labor, only five out of Russia’s fifty regions have records of those leaving for jobs abroad.

Given legalization and appropriate organization, emigration of labor could obviously become an important factor in Russia’s economic development. Every thousand Russian citizens working abroad could yield the country an annual average of US $8 million. If the process increases and the number of those employed abroad rises to 1.5 million people in the next 10 years, Russia could gain some US $50 billion in the form of balance of payments revenue from emigrant labor and about US $10 billion in revenue to the federal budget from mediator firms [2]. This input of hard currency would substantially contribute to the growth of domestic business and boost the rate of economic growth.

 

Import of labor

 

In 1994, the Ministry of Labor of the Russian Federation gathered and analyzed data on recruitment of foreign labor and departure of Russian citizens for work abroad. However, the state of affairs of external labor migration cannot yet be properly assessed, because, first, monitoring and registration of migrant labor is only beginning and, second, the bulk of it is penetrating the Russian labor market illegally. A survey by the Krai migration service, made in towns and districts of Krasnodar Krai jointly with employment agencies, revealed that only 7.7% of foreign workers (not counting those from ex-Soviet republics) have official status, while all the others are, in effect, illegal migrants. The Committee for Labor and Social Problems holds that selective checks are the only way to monitor foreign labor in the country. In Novgorod oblast’, for example, only 2.2% of foreign workers have official employment permits. In Pskov oblast’, none of the enterprises employing foreigners (including employment under intergovernmental agreements) have the permission of the Federal Migration Service. The Ministry of Labor reports that the whereabouts of 5000 Vietnamese in the country are unknown; this exceeds the number of all legally employed Vietnamese. The Federal Migration Service estimates that more than 500000 foreign nationals and stateless persons classified by the Russian authorities as illegal migrants are domiciled in Russia today, of whom 180000 reside in Moscow and about 90000 in St. Petersburg [4]. The epidemic of illegal migration is gradually assuming the dimensions of a serious political problem. The question of “Chinatowns” in Russian territory, for instance, is an acute problem. A special raid in Primorskii Krai’s Partisanskii raion revealed that more than 15000 Chinese reside there, in addition to its 7000 Russians [5]. The Krasnoyarsk Krai administration claims that some 500 illegal Chinese migrants reside there [6], while other estimates say that the number of Chinese residing illegally in Siberia and the Russian Far East is close to 1 million [7]. However, even if we assume that the mass of illegal migrants totals 1.5 million persons (that, as I see it, is the highest possible estimate), this amounts to only about 2% of those employed in Russia and cannot be regarded as critical. Thus, the problem of preventing uncontrolled expansion of foreign labor in the Russian labor market has a certain reserve of time.

Analysis of information received by the Ministry of Labor from local labor agencies of the 50 regions shows that the geography of foreign labor sources is not as extensive as in the case of general migration streams. Officially, labor comes to Russia from at least 32 countries (excluding ex–Soviet republics), and its numbers reach 44000 people, which amounts to 0.06% of those employed in the Russian economy. The composition of the “big six” is changing somewhat: the leading labor suppliers are North Korea, Vietnam, and Bulgaria (Table 2). No longer are Russia’s immediate neighbors the leading donor countries. Consequently, geographic location is less of a factor in the migration of labor than it is in general migration. The concentration of foreign labor according to donor countries is exceedingly high: more than 93% comes from the “big six.”

As Table 3 shows, nearly all foreign labor is employed in material production and only 1.3% is concentrated in the nonproductive sphere. Most guest workers are in construction, manufacturing, farming, and logging, with the last two fields attracting the largest number, while construction is geographically the most diversified. This is indirect evidence of a personnel shortage in the above fields.

The occupational qualification of foreign workers is given in Table 4 according to the classification suggested in [8]. The bulk are so–called blue-collar workers recruited for unattractive vacancies. However, a certain extreme has come into evidence in their structure: managers predominate, though there is hardly any shortage of them. The opportunities for employing rare professions, however, are obviously overlooked. Among those employed, for example, are interpreters for exotic languages and doctors practicing nontraditional medicine, while there is a shortage of, say, jewelers, and the Minis try of Foreign Affairs says the State Committee for Precious Metals is prepared to employ some.

There is evidence of the demographic pressure of guest workers. In particular, the percentage of women among them is under 2%. With the stream of immigrants growing, the demographic disproportions will become greater still. And one more observation: compared with the previous period, the international exchange of labor resources is now gravitating toward “free” forms: only 52% of foreigners are employed under international agreements, while the rest are hired by direct contact.

A few words about the effectiveness of foreign labor. In most regions, recruitment of guest workers is prompted by the introduction of the latest technologies. Other factors are the higher degree of professionalism, the labor and technological discipline of foreigners, and the broader range of occupations and services they offer. In Krasnoyarsk Krai, for example, Chinese vegetable growers use their own cultivation methods and work through the entire light day, and in the Komi Republic, Nobel Oil, Arctic Oil, and other joint ventures are introducing advanced technologies and teaching their Russian colleagues new methods of drilling and oil and gas extraction. Such factors as closeness of the border; a favorable ethnic, cultural, and linguistic environment; unprestigious jobs; and lower pay are less significant. The impact of the two groups of factors on the country’s economy works in different directions. If former leads to a diffusion of knowledge and higher efficiency of production, then the latter contributes to maintenance of low–profit and unprofitable enterprises and the freezing of the country’s or region’s irrational economic structure.

 

Table 3. Occupational structure of foreign workers in Russia as of January 1, 1994, %

Donor countries

Branches of the economy

Total

material production

nonproductive field

industry

agriculture and logging

construction

transport and communications

trading and catering

public health and social security

education

science and related occupations

North Korea

0.11

38.66

4.40

0

0.16

0.05

0

0

43.38

China

5.29

1.97

12.72

0.67

0.49

0.03

0.04

0

21.21

Bulgaria

12.67

0

0.33

0

0

0

0

1.10

14.10

Vietnam

6.62

0

1.53

0

0.27

0

0

0

8.42

Turkey

0.01

0

5.06

0

0.01

0

0.01

0

5.09

Mongolia

0.01

0

1.24

0

0

0

0

0

1.25

Poland

0

0

1.17

0

0.01

0

0

0

1.18

Yugoslavia

0.35

0

0.64

0

0

0

0

0

0.99

India

0

0

0.53

0

0

0

0

0

0.53

Other countries

1.24

0.01

2.48

0

0.05

0.01

0.06

0

3.85

Total

26.30

40.64

30.10

0.67

0.99

0.09

0.11

1.10

100.00

 

One of the side effects of the migration of labor is an increase in commodity exchanges between countries. However, the state of affairs in this area cannot yet be called satisfactory. According to figures of the Far Eastern border authorities, twice as much freight passes through customs en route to China than from China to Russia, meaning that our country has a passive balance in this type of Russo–Chinese trading. Moreover, its structure is extremely ineffective. In just ten months of 1993, ferrous and nonferrous metals, mineral fertilizer, lumber, oil products, cement, cars, and tractors shipped out of Khabarovsk Krai to China amounted to US $130 million. The flow of goods into Russia consisted of canned meat, apples, candy, biscuits, vodka, alcohol, and the like, whose quality, moreover, left much to be desired [5].

 

Table 4. Occupational breakdown of foreign labor as of January 1, 1994, %

Categories of foreign labor

Percentage of total

Unskilled, nonprestigious, and heavy jobs

87.0

Specialists in rapidly developing and priority fields

4.8

Rare professions

2.4

Investors and ranking personnel of firms and their subdivisions

5.3

Specialists of the highest class and members of free professions

0.5

 

Many regions still use natural resources (oil, gas) and agricultural produce (sugar, com) as payment for labor. In Tambov oblast’, for example, 42.7% of foreign workers are employed on partial or complete barter terms, and in the Republic of Buryatiya this figure is as high as 72.5%. True, of late the practice is being renounced. Barter deals of that kind have been taken under control. In Primorskii Krai, for example, the authorities have struck mineral fertilizer, lumber, non–ferrous metals, and seafoods off the list of exchange able goods. Note that the role of commodity exchanges related to external labor migration should not be under estimated in general economic terms. It is highly important, in fact, that relatively science–intensive items made in Russia can be exchanged for relatively capital-intensive items made abroad. This exchange paves the way for shifting national capital outlays into science-intensive production, which tends to reduce the cost of materials of the intermediate product and to heighten the general efficiency of production. In the United States, a similar foreign trade policy partially cushions the cyclical fluctuations in the dynamics of economic growth, on one hand, and serves as a relative means of economizing labor and capital, on the other [9]. It appears, therefore, that the structure of the “collateral” export of commodities, chiefly of resources, will have a negative effect, above all in the long term.

We know from foreign experience that growth of external migration, especially if illegal, regardless of the type of migration (forced or commercial, including all types of short business trips), always leads to a sharp increase of crime. The presence of Chinese migrants on Russian soil is accompanied by mass disorders and bloody clashes between criminal groups. In many cases, the OMON (special–purpose police) are forced to intervene and neutralize aggressive activity [5]. To be fair, however, it should be noted that Chinese settlers on abandoned lands in Amur oblast’ are building houses and roads, growing vegetables, and opening shops, in brief, reanimating villages that had gone to rack and rain.

Although the process of attracting labor to Russia from abroad is only just getting off the ground, we are already able to forecast the developments. To begin with, the occupational structure of the guest labor force, as well as its qualifications and distribution by gender, is not likely to change. The structure of the donor countries, however, is not yet stable and will change noticeably in due course. Highly probable, among other things, are shifts in the ranking of these countries with respect to their degree of importance. The gradual vitalization of market–economy channels of international migration will lead to an increase in the percentage of foreigners employed by direct contact. The legal influx of foreign workers is already being restricted by authorities and regional labor agencies, in view of mounting unemployment. The influx will, therefore, most probably continue through illegal immigration.

 

The main problems

 

Let us now examine the more important and urgent problems of external labor migration, settlement of which will allow for more stable regulation of the process.

(1) Absence of standard definitions, in particular, concerning interpretation of the term “foreign labor.” Some apply the term only to citizens from outside the former Soviet Union, while others include those who come from former Soviet republics.

(2) We have practically no idea of the number of labor migrants from former Soviet republics. However, it is obviously much greater than the influx from other foreign countries.

(3) No clearcut differentiation of functions and powers exists between governmental agencies involved in external labor migration. This applies to the Ministry of Labor of the Russian Federation and the Federal Employment and Federal Migration services of Russia. Furthermore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Social Protection, the Federal Counterintelligence Service, the External Intelligence Service, the State Committee for Tourism, and other agencies are also taking part in the resolution of specific issues. Worth noting here is unique experience of Russia, where an independent body was instituted to deal with problems of migration, the Federal Migration Service. In other countries, analogous business is transacted by special subdivisions (administrations, departments, institutions, and the like) of ministries of labor and foreign and internal affairs.

(4) Absence of conditions for “see–saw” migration of citizens from former Soviet lands. Clearly, it is undesirable to apply general rules for employing foreign labor to people living just across the border. Enterprises of a few regions that traditionally employed people living in neighboring countries are already experiencing financial difficulties, due to the need for licenses.

(5) Absence of quotas (limits) for reception of foreign labor by legal persons. At Abakanvagonstroi (rail road car manufacturers) in the Khakass republic of the Russian Federation, includes guest workers comprise 24% of the work force; in Khabarovsk Krai at the Gesprid Joint Venture; and in the Republic of Buryatiya at the Unegeteiskii State Farm such workers total 41%; at the Века Joint Venture in St. Petersburg, they are 73%, and, at the Tyndales Association in Amur oblast’ they are as much as 91%. In comparison, the percentage of foreign labor per enterprise in Saudi Arabia is legislatively limited to 25% [10].

(6) The status of seasonal migrant labor is not defined, and no allowances or privileges are provided for a given group. Schoolchildren and students show much interest in seasonal (mainly agricultural) jobs. However, to require obligatory licensing in such cases is obviously incongruous.

(7) The official status and visa regulations for external migrant workers have not been defined. In the United States, for example, different visa regulations and rules of stay are provided for [11].

(8) No deportation mechanism exists for illegal migrants and no source of funding of deportation of those who are in the category of self–employed has been defined.

(9) The mechanism for protecting the labor rights of Russian citizens working abroad is not functioning properly, which leads to gross violations of the law by employers and middlemen [12].

(10) The absence of single governmental statistics prevents dependable forecasting of external labor migration and enactment of a goal-oriented and selective migration policy.

 

Basic conclusions

 

The above study leads to the following methodological conclusions.

First, unlike the majority of countries in the world, which, as a rule, specialize in either export or import of labor, Russia is at once an importer and an exporter. It is, therefore, essential to shape an economic mechanism and enact legal standards in order to ensure high efficiency of both streams.

Second, immigration, rather than emigration, of labor is at present of greater interest to Russia. Hence, priority in governmental regulation should go to import of labor, with emphasis on urgent enactment of restrictive norms protecting the national labor market from outside expansion.

Third, problems related to illegal import and export of labor are most acute at present, which also requires priority solution of the pertinent issues through enactment of specific legal safeguards, including stricter penalties for illegal actions.

Fourth, Russia’s external labor migration policy has a geographical complexion and requires a differentiated approach to formerly Soviet countries and other lands and, in particular, appropriate criteria and principles of governmental regulation that envisage a protectionist policy in relation to former Soviet republics.

 

Suggestions

 

The experience of foreign countries with an effective arsenal of organizational, legal, and normative structures could evidently be a key to settling the pre vailing problems. Any set of practical suggestions of how to put external labor migration processes in order should include the following.

The term migrant laborer applies to a person who will, does, or did engage in paid activity in a state of which he or she is not a national. This definition is based on the pertinent provision of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Laborers and Members of Their Families (adopted at the 45th UN General Assembly in 1990). The Convention also allows us to identify a number of specific groups of migrant laborers.

Russian or joint–venture legal persons (enterprises, organizations, and firms) may employ foreign migrant labor if their total personnel numbers not less than ten persons.

Foreign migrant labor employed at any Russian or joint enterprise, organization, or firm shall not exceed 20% of its total personnel.

Only those Russian and joint legal persons (enterprises, organizations, and firms) whose authorized fund is not less than US $30000 may employ foreign migrant labor. If the authorized fund is in some other currency, it shall be calculated at the Central Bank of Russia’s current exchange rate at the moment the said enterprise applies to the Federal Migration Service. The document confirming the financial state of the enterprise must be signed by its head and bear its official seal. Submission of the statutes of the enterprise concerned is obligatory.

Only those Russian or foreign physical persons (citizens) who have an independent business and an annual income of not less than US $10000 or a bank account equivalent to that sum may hire foreign migrant labor. Submission of certified information concerning the bank account or a declaration on incomes for the preceding year shall be obligatory.

Wealthy Russian and foreign citizens wishing to employ foreigners for their private needs may do so if they have an annual income of more than US $10000 or a bank account equivalent to that sum. Certified information concerning the bank account or a declaration on incomes for the preceding year shall be obligatory.

Foreign investors may conduct business on the territory of Russia, provided they submit written guarantees that the invested funds shall remain in the country’s economy for not less than two years. The foreign entrepreneur’s written pledge shall be certified at the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Labor and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The invested capital shall not be below US $100000.

Russian and joint legal persons and Russian and foreign physical persons may employ foreign migrant labor, provided the foreigners do not do work that is specified in the List of Professions Closed for Foreigners, which is annually published by the Ministry of Labor of the Russian Federation.

Any foreign migrant worker who wants to change his employer and type of employment must obtain the approval of the Federal Employment Service and permission of the Federal Migration Service. Permission may be cancelled before expiry of the contract if the situation on the labor market so requires. The decision on this score is made by the Federal Migration Service on the basis of the appropriate ruling of the Ministry of Labor of the Russian Federation.

Foreign migrant laborers may reunite with their families on Russian territory on the following terms:

– They must have a permanent job and an income high enough to maintain their families. The income per family member must be not less than ten minimum salaries, as fixed by the government of the Russian Federation.

– The migrant laborer’s job must be of a stable nature. To confirm this, the migrant must submit to the Federal Migration Service his or her contract, made out for not less than a year from the moment of application.

– The migrant worker must have housing that meets standards of comfort as certified by the local housing manager.

– The migrant laborer’s children must not be over 18, as confirmed by birth certificates.

In case foreign migrant workers change their domicile or place of work, the legal or physical persons who employed them shall inform the security agency of the said change within 48 hours.

Legal and physical persons intending to employ foreign migrant laborers shall, together with an application to this effect, submit to the Federal Migration Service a check for US $ 1000 per worker as a guarantee that he or she will be sent home in the event of force majeure.

Legal persons registered under established procedure and appropriately licensed may be middlemen in the employment of Russian citizens abroad.

A Russian citizen leaving the country to find employment abroad must submit to the appropriate agency of the Ministry of Internal Affairs documents provided for in “Requirements for Citizens Going Abroad,” which are drawn up and endorsed by the Labor Ministry of the Russian Federation.

A Russian citizen seeking employment abroad may not be assisted in finding such employment if it is listed in the List of Deficit Professions, which is annually drawn up and endorsed by the Labor Ministry of Labor of the Russian Federation.

It stands to reason that these measures are not unquestionable and lay no claim to covering all ground. However, inclusion of such provisions in the appropriate sections of the Employment Law, the Labor Law Code, and other normative documents will help relieve some of the tensions on the Russian labor market and heighten its efficiency.

 

References

 

1. Morozov A. Brain Enuresis: A Disease of the Scientific Elite. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 1994, March 29.

2. Kamenskii A. Working Abroad: What Does Russia Gain? Ekonomika i Zhizn’, 1994, no. 10.

3. Tikhonov V., Dolgikh E., Ledeneva L„ and Shkol’nikov V. Utechka Umov: Potentsial, Problemy, Perspektivy (Brain Drain: Potential, Problems, Prospects), Moscow: Inst. Probl. Zanyatnosti, Ross. Akad. Nauk, 1993.

4. Informatsionnyi Byulleten’ po Voprosam Migratsii. Moscow: Byuro MOM, 1994, no. 3.

5. Reznik B. Chinese in the Russian Far East: Guests or Masters? Izvestiya, 1993, no. 234.

6. Tarasov A. Who Benefits from Siberia’s Might if Chinese Develop It? Izvestiya, 1994, April 16.

7. Tarasov A. Is Siberia for Russians Only? Izvestiya, 1993, no. 209.

8. Balatskii E.V. Government Regulation of Labor Imports. Mirovaya Ekon. i Mezhdunar. Otnosheniya, 1994, no. 7.

9. Evstigneev V.R. Foreign Trade in the System of a Cyclical Mechanism of Social Reproduction (on the Example of the United States). Ekon. Mat. Metody, 1989, vol. 25, issue 1.

10. Kulyamzin A.A. Strany Persidskogo Zaliva: Immigratsiya i Klassovaya Struktura (50–80-e Gody) [Persian Gulf Countries: Immigration and the Class Structure (1950s – 1980s)]. Moscow: Nauka, 1990.

11. Nikolaichik V.M. Immigratsiya i Grazhdanstvo v SShA: Spravochnoe Posobie po Immigratsionnomu Zakonodatel’stvu SShA (Immigration and Citizenship in the USA: Manual on US Immigration Laws). Moscow: PSO, 1992.

 

 

 

 

Official link to the article:

 

Balatskii E.V. External Labor Migration// «Herald of the Russian academy of sciences», Vol. 64. No. 5, 1994, pp. 359–365.

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В статье рассматривается очередной этап формирования российского рынка экономических журналов, который характеризуется его четким разделением на два сегмента – внешний и внутренний. Внешний сегмент включает издания, вошедшие в международные базы данных Scopus и Web of Science (WoS), внутренний – издания, не попавшие в эти базы. Для отражения произошедших на рынке изменений предлагается очередная модернизация методики составления Рейтинга ведущих экономических журналов (РВЭЖ) России. Нововведения затрагивают подсистему экспертной оценки изданий внешнего сегмента с учетом дифференциации баз Scopus и WoS на квартили, а также подсистему рыночной репрезентации, учитывающую наличие русско- и англоязычных версий журнала. Приведены результаты 5-ой волны РВЭЖ в виде Алмазного списка (13 лучших журналов) и Списка второго эшелона журналов, состоящего из 12 изданий.
The paper considers the next stage of formation of the Russian market of economic journals, which is characterized by its clear division into two segments – external and internal. The external segment contains publications included in the international databases Scopus and Web of Science (WoS), the internal segment covers publications that are not included in these databases. To reflect the changes that have occurred in the market, we upgrade the methodology for compiling the Rating of Russia’s Leading Economic Journals (RLEJ). The innovations affect the subsystem of expert assessment of publications included in the external segment, taking into account the differentiation of Scopus and WoS databases on quartiles, as well as the subsystem of market representation, taking into account the availability of Russian and English versions of journals. We provide the results of the fifth wave of RLEJ rating in the form of a Diamond List (top 13 journals) and a List of Journals of the Second Tier, consisting of 12 titles. We analyze the reshuffling of journals in comparison with previous years; we show that Russia already has 19 economic publications with international certification, of which eight publications have double certification (both Scopus and WoS). We consider several stylized examples of success and failure of journals; this allows us to determine the outlines of a general model for development of publications of the international level. In particular, we review the work of the heads of journals “at the top” – as drivers of their development through establishing external relations and finding financial resources, and their work “at the bottom” — as organizers of local scientific communities and exclusive intermediaries between authors and professional translators. Certain changes are pointed out in the employment relationship with highly qualified translators; now they are characterized by greater flexibility compared to the previous period. We also consider medium-and long-term implications of the emergence of two market segments of Russian economic journals.
Статья посвящена политической дилемме, стоящей перед российскими властями относительно введения прогрессивного подоходного налога. Для обсуждения целесообразности отмены плоской шкалы подоходного налога и ее замены на прогрессивную шкалу авторы предлагают трехпараметрическую модель, которая позволяет проводить сценарные расчёты для различных вариантов налоговой реформы с учетом ее влияния на доходы бюджета и социальное неравенство, а также реализуемости проектируемых параметров. Для обеспечения корректности макроэкономических расчетов выполнена калибровка исходных статистических данных относительно распределения высокодоходной группы (десятого дециля) населения. Введены два условия калибровки, выполнение которых обязательно для нейтрализации искажений в прикладных расчетах. Данная процедура позволила установить, что предложения трех политический фракций, выступающих за введение прогрессивной шкалы подоходного налога («Справедливая Россия», ЛДПР и КПРФ), кратно завышают фискальный эффект от предполагаемого институционального нововведения. Для сравнения проектов реформы подоходного налогообложения трех политических фракций (партия «Справедливая Россия», ЛДПР и КПРФ) и проекта Правительства Российской Федерации, предлагающего сохранить плоскую шкалу налога с одновременным повышением его ставки с 13 до 15%, предлагается учет риска проектов с помощью процедуры анкетного опроса, позволяющей получить экспертные оценки степени реализуемости рассматриваемых проектов. Результаты прикладных расчетов показали, что самым предпочтительным является проект Правительства Российской Федерации, что свидетельствует, по мнению авторов, об отсутствии рационального альтернативного предложения по внедрению прогрессивной шкалы подоходного налога. Обосновывается тезис, согласно которому в России отсутствует консенсус между оппозиционными политическими партиями и экспертным сообществом, что не позволяет им выступить с единым и хорошо проработанным проектом реформы подоходного налогообложения.
Яндекс.Метрика



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